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NRA v City of Chicago:
Does the Second Amendment Bind
Frank Easterbrook?
RichardA. Epsteint
INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that Frank Easterbrook will go down as one
of the great appellate judges in the history of the United States. As
those of us who know him well can testify, he is a judge who brings his
immense intelligence and fierce dedication to his judicial work. Easterbrook also produces opinions that are always a pleasure to readshort and incisive, without pointless verbiage. One can disagree with
their conclusions. But it is impossible to mistake their meaning. I agree
wholeheartedly with just about everything he writes on a wide range
of issues that deal with antitrust, contracts, corporations, and securities
law. I have had more disagreements on his approach to constitutional
law. Easterbrook does not like, nor does he need, praise. So I shall
write about constitutional law.
Easterbrook sports a distinctive approach to constitutional law
whose key elements quickly come to the surface in his powerful, but
ultimately unpersuasive, opinion in NRA v City of Chicago,' on which
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.! Because stare decisis casts a
powerful spell over Easterbrook's work, NRA is in some sense an aberration: for a man accustomed to blunt talking, it is not clear whether
Easterbrook agrees with his own argument. More specifically, Easterbrook sounds two separate themes in NRA that point in radically different directions. The first speaks of the reflexive institutional deference that all inferior court judges should show on matters on which
the Supreme Court has spoken. On this issue, Easterbrook deploys his
powerful pen in the defense of the rule that explicit holdings must be
followed even if, in the interim, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
t James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law
School; The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and Visiting Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
I would like to thank Nelson Lund for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Caroline
Van Ness, NYU School of Law Class of 2011, for her excellent research assistance in preparing
this Essay.
1 567 F3d 856 (7th Cir 2009).
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have ripped their constitutional foundations to shreds.! The second of
his arguments goes to the merits of the underlying dispute on whether
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies to the
states through the action of the Fourteenth Amendment.' It takes
little imagination to see that the first point only invites the Supreme
Court to consider the entire matter, while the second demands an exhaustive review of the historical arguments for and against incorporation, which will necessarily range far afield after the Court's key decision in Districtof Columbia v Heller.! As everyone by now knows, the

Second Amendment, which Easterbrook does not bother to quote in
NRA, is drafted like the object of a bad law school examination question when it states that: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."6 Heller read the Amendment to protect
the right of an individual to keep and bear arms within his own home.
In order to reach that conclusion, Justice Antonin Scalia had to treat
the initial thirteen words of the Amendment as precatory, after which
he concluded that the substantive command in the remainder of the
text created an individual right that could only be limited by a showing of some state interest stronger than any normally required under
the rational basis test.! Judge Easterbrook did not, and would not,
pause to inquire into the soundness of Heller, which I think is subject
to many weaknesses.
Academic writers do not take marching orders from the Supreme
Court, so they can address the question without risking court martial. In
my view, the key concern here is that the initial clause, in speaking
about a well-regulated militia, addresses the ability of states to organize
local military operations in ways that resist overreaching by the federal
government. As such, the Amendment has to bind only the federal government. That point was held explicitly in United States v Cruikshank,
and, more significantly, in Presser v Illinois,'o which read the Second
Amendment as part of the overall constitutional scheme, including the
3
4

See NRA, 567 F3d at 857-59.
Id at 859-60.

5

128 S Ct 2783 (2008).
US Const Amend II.
7 Heller, 128 S Ct at 2817 n 27 (explaining that if a rational basis was all that was necessary
to overcome the right to bear arms, the Second Amendment "would have no effect").
6

8 For an account, see generally Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the
Second Amendment: Why Heller Is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 Syracuse L Rev

171 (2008) (urging that the Second Amendment does not apply to Washington, DC, which has no
militia that needs to be shielded from federal usurpation).
9 92 US 542,553 (1875).
10 116 US 252,267-68 (1886) (preserving a zone of autonomous authority for the states to
regulate the use of firearms for public safety purposes).
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division of authority set out in Article I, §8 of the Constitution." Under this approach, ironically, the only place to which the Second
Amendment does not apply is Washington, DC, where there is no state
militia of any sort to regulate. Justice Scalia necessarily rejects that
argument by stripping the preamble of any substantive bite. Once that
decision is settled in the wrong way, incorporation against the states
surges to the top of the agenda. In order to see Easterbrook's constitutional style in action, it is instructive to contrast his view on both
topics with the far longer and more complex decision of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain in Nordyke v King,2 which went quickly to the
substantive issues and found that the Second Amendment did bind
each state as a regulator, but did not limit its power to exclude guns
from county fairgrounds that it owned and operated." Let us take the
two points up in order.
I. SHOULD THE CIRCUIT COURTS REVISIT THE
INCORPORATION QUESTION?

Easterbrook's opening gambit shows his keen awareness of his
circumscribed role as an appellate court judge. He thus quotes Supreme Court precedent to the effect that lower court judges are dutybound to apply holdings that are squarely on point "even if the reasoning in later opinions has undermined their rationale." 4 To say that
subsequent decisions have "undermined" the logic of Cruikshank and
Presseris to belittle the huge constitutional top-to-bottom revolution
that took place over the course of more than one hundred years.
Cruikshank was a Reconstruction-era decision that arose out of a political struggle in Louisiana, which escalated into violence, resulting in
the death of about one hundred black citizens.' Thereafter, the federal
government prosecuted for conspiracy a group of white individuals for
their efforts to "hinder" the assertion of rights," including the right to
keep and bear arms, by southern blacks guaranteed to them under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States."" These broad words
11 US Const Art I, § 8, cls 16-17 (outlining coordination mechanisms between the United
States and the various states).
12 563 F3d 439 (9th Cir 2009), rehearing en banc granted, 575 F3d 890 (9th Cir 2009).
13 563 F3d at 458-60 (concluding that the Second Amendment right to own firearms does
not extend to possession on government property).
14 NRA, 567 F3d at 857 (respecting the limited scope of an appellate judge's purview).
15 For a detailed account, see generally Charles Lane, The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax
Massacre, the Supreme Court, and the Betrayal of Reconstruction (Henry Holt 2008).
16 Cruikshank, 92 US at 544-45.
17 US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
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had been narrowly read in the then-recent authority of the Slaughter8 which concerned the validity of a statutory monopoly
House Cases,'
afforded by the state of Louisiana to the Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing and Slaughter-House Company." According to Justice Samuel Miller, that clause only applied to the rights that persons had as
federal citizens, most notably to petition the United States for redress
of grievances under the First Amendment.2 Cruikshank held that the
prosecutions were beyond the power of the federal government,
thereby freeing the killers. The tragic effect of Slaughter-House was to
sharply limit federal criminal oversight of local governments in the
South through a decision that held that none of the Bill of Rights of
the United States, including the Second Amendment, was binding on
the states.2 In three years, we moved from a potential economic risk to
a breakdown in constitutional government.
But for Easterbrook these epochal institutional matters do not
inform the discussion. To him the key point was the explicit holding on
incorporation. It did not matter that the only clause the Supreme
Court considered in Cruikshank was the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Nor did it matter that within a generation, the Supreme Court
recouped much of the ground that had been ceded in Slaughter-House
by starting to read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate a wide range of rights found in the Bill of
Rights against the states." On these technical issues, the bulk of the
legal authority goes against the Easterbrook opinion, because Cruikshank did not consider the due process arguments, which raise different issues. In other instances, intermediate courts have reconsidered
old decisions, without drawing any rebuke from the Supreme Court.3
Judge O'Scannlain was clearly untroubled by the institutional limitation, and readily concluded that this constitutional revolution fairly

21

83 US 36 (1872).
Id at 60.
Id at 78-80.
Id at 82.

22

See Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co v Crescent City Live-

18
19
20

Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co, 111 US 746, 750 (1884) (using the Due Process Clause to
replace the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
23
For a discussion, see Nelson Lund, Anticipating Second Amendment Incorporation: The
Role of the Inferior Courts, 59 Syracuse L Rev 185,198-99 & n 73 (2008). Lund mentions Latimore
v Sielaff, 561 F2d 691, 693 n 2 (7th Cir 1977) (finding a Sixth Amendment right to public trial without acknowledging the Supreme Court precedent to the contrary), prior to Gannett Co, Inc v DePasquale, 443 US 368,379 (1979) (affirming that the Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states).
Lund cited this and other cases in Amicus Curiae Brief of Sixty-Nine State Legislators from Illinois,
Indiana, and Wisconsin Supporting Appellants' Prayer for Reversal of the Judgment, NRA v City of
Chicago, Nos 08-4241,08-4243,08-4244, *15-16 (7th Cir filed Feb 9,2009) (available on Westlaw at
2009 WL 462552). They were not discussed in the Easterbrook opinion.
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invited a reconsideration of Cruikshank and Presser, and conducted
an exhaustive inquiry from Blackstone on forward. He concluded that
the right to keep and bear arms had been regarded as a fundamental
right at the time of the American Revolution, which had been carried
forward through the Due Process Clause.
Judge Easterbrook was brusque in his rejection of the
O'Scannlain authority, preferring to rely on the decision of the Second
Circuit in Maloney v Cuomo,2 which held that no constitutional challenge could be lodged against a New York law that forbade the use of
"nunchakus" in the home.26 The per curiam panel decision (on which
now-Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor sat) never addressed
incorporation explicitly, but only concluded that the New York statute
could pass the traditional rational basis test for the Fourteenth
Amendment that Justice Scalia had in fact rejected in Heller.2 To my
mind, Judge O'Scannlain was right to conclude that nothing in the
earlier decisions precluded the circuit courts from seeing how the current Supreme Court construction of incorporation applied to the particular case. He chose to apply the current framework in part because
the entire incorporation doctrine had been cast into utter confusion
by Slaughter-House.Unlike Easterbrook, he did not think he usurped
any Supreme Court prerogatives by offering his best opinion on an
issue that he well knew would land in the lap of the Supreme Court.
He read the Supreme Court's announcement in Heller that the case
did not resolve the incorporation question" as an invitation to lower
courts to consider the matter on the merits, so as to let the high court
benefit from their deliberations.
Easterbrook looks elsewhere to justify his decision to elevate the
passive virtues on this incorporation question. One of the worst of
many bad Supreme Court antitrust decisions of the 1960s was Albrecht v Herald Co," which held, quite inexcusably, that the antitrust
laws imposed a per se rule against letting a publisher set maximum
price restraints on its distributors."' When a challenge to Albrecht came
to the Seventh Circuit in Khan v State Oil Co," Judge Richard Posner
(on a panel on which Easterbrook did not sit) eviscerated the decision
but refused to overrule it, citing the need to respect his role as the
See Nordyke, 563 F3d at 457.
554 F3d 56 (2d Cir 2009).
Id at 60 (upholding NY Penal Law § 265.01(1) (McKinney)).
27 Maloney, 554 F3d at 59-60 (concluding that the legislative history of the statute provides
a rational basis for the ban on nunchakus).
28 See Heller,128 S Ct at 2813 n 23.
29
390 US 145 (1968).
3o Id at 152-53.
31 93 F3d 1358 (7th Cir 1996).
24

2
26
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judge on an inferior court.2 His advocacy was promptly rewarded
when the Supreme Court unanimously overruled Albrecht the next
year, thanking the Seventh Circuit for its patience." That decision
could have set the tone for Easterbrook to understand his role while
voicing his opinions on the merits.
There is also the further question of whether judges on inferior
courts should use antitrust cases as a template for constitutional litigation. As a matter of general atmospherics, the gap between a technical
antitrust issue and a hot-button constitutional issue looks large. Just
look at how the two cases tee up. According to Posner, the great flaw
of Albrecht was that it failed to consider how consumer welfare could
be advanced by these maximum price limitations." This is no small
matter in antitrust law. But the transformation in constitutional theory
between Cruikshank and Presser on the one hand and Heller on the

other is not accurately measured by some missed line of argument.
Rather, this difference represents a full-scale constitutional revolution
that invoked a different portion of the Fourteenth Amendment-the
Due Process Clause-whose substantive contours did not start to develop until at least a generation after Slaughter-House." Since that
time, moreover, we have moved from the world of selective incorporation under Palko v Connecticut6 (though overruled by the Warren
Court decision in Benton v Maryland"), which adopted the present
test that requires incorporation of those rights without which "a fair
and enlightened system of justice would be impossible.""
Judge O'Scannlain did not pause to worry about institutional role
when he offered his defense of incorporation. Easterbrook, however,
was wholly unfazed by the constitutional revolution. Far from going
into a detailed historical argument, he contents himself with the observation that incorporating the Second Amendment under Heller is
in fact a more questionable step than the overruling of Khan." He
32 Id at 1362-64 (expressing "considerable sympathy" for the arguments against Albrecht
but refusing "to read the sibylline leaves of the US. Reports for prophetic clues to overruling").
33 See State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3,20,22 (1997).
See Khan, 93 F3d at 1363 (observing that the Supreme Court had not adequately consid3
ered in Albrecht that "a price ceiling is a natural and procompetitive incident to a scheme of
territorial exclusivity").
35 See, for example, Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US 578, 589 (1897) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects economic liberty against state regulation).
36 302 US 319,322 (1937) (denying incorporation of the double jeopardy protection of the
Fifth Amendment).
37 395 US 784, 794 (1969) (recognizing that Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection
"represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage").
38 Palko, 302 US at 325.
39 See NRA, 567 F3d at 858-59 (explaining that the proper outcome of Khan was much
more straightforward).
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notes that incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment still remains selective, and that neither the Third
Amendment (involving the quartering of soldiers), nor the Seventh
Amendment (requiring jury trials in actions at common law for more
than $20), has been applied to the states. He does so without mentioning, however, that one year before Benton, the Due Process Clause
was read in Duncan v Louisiana"to require the use of a jury in state
criminal cases." Easterbrook also notes that incorporation status has
never been granted to the Fifth Amendment requirements of grand
jury indictment and presentment, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail."
It is instructive to note that Judge O'Scannlain considered none
of these specific constitutional guarantees, but directed his exclusive
attention to an exhaustive examination of the historical treatment of
the right to keep and bear arms in both England and the United
States. That approach is consistent with the general reasoning in Benton, which explicitly refers to historical sources." Easterbrook overstates the matter when he dismisses Benton as a case that itself "paid
little heed to history."" If he had been right on that issue, at that, he
could have called a halt to his opinion, for there would have been no
reason for him to consider the underlying merits of the matter once
his role as a judge on an inferior court remains clear. Nonetheless,
Easterbrook does not take the austere line but, without missing a beat,
continues to discuss the substantive issue in a way intended to widen
the gulf between himself and O'Scannlain. My best guess is that he
thinks that incorporation is the likely Supreme Court result, even
though he would rule otherwise. Putting the pieces together is a fascinating inquiry.

Id.
391 US 145 (1968).
42
Id at 148-49.
43 NRA, 567 F3d at 858-59.
44 395 US at 795:
The fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can hardly be doubted.
Its origins can be traced to Greek and Roman times, and it became established in the common law of England long before this Nation's independence.... As with many other elements of the common law, it was carried into the jurisprudence of this Country through the
medium of Blackstone, who codified the doctrine in his Commentaries.
45 NRA, 567 F3d at 859.
4

41
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II. DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT BIND THE STATES?
A. History and Text
In approaching this question, Easterbrook well understands that
he cannot prevail by appealing to the limited scope of authority of
inferior federal court judges. Immediately, therefore, after his belittling of Benton, he launches into his own account of the history, which
is far briefer than that undertaken by O'Scannlain. Indeed the contrast could not be more apparent. O'Scannlain, obviously under the
influence of the originalist view of constitutional interpretation, goes
to great pains to quote and analyze all the key texts that address the
disputed right to keep and bear arms. His decision in Nordyke quotes
or refers to Blackstone with approval some twenty-eight times, while
weaving together a web that shows the fundamentality of the right to
keep and bear arms to the American Revolution." In so doing, he conscientiously gives Blackstone the same pride of place that the Supreme Court attached to it in Duncan, which pertains to the right to a
jury trial," and of course in Heller itself, which refers to Blackstone.4
O'Scannlain's historical effort is not entirely successful because many
of the passages he quotes from the revolutionary period could be
sensibly read as showing a resentment of the efforts of the British
government to restrain the use of arms in the colonies. That surely
applies to the quotations that deal with the opposition to "royal infringements" of colonial prerogatives.4
Nonetheless, at this point, Easterbrook, whose own strong brand
of textualism is averse to these historical exercises, puts Blackstone
into his place by noting that all of his English speculations dealt with
political and not constitutionalrights, given the British practice of parliamentary supremacy."o And he continues his denigration of Blackstone by noting that Blackstone regarded fixed sentences as a bulwark
of individual liberty, a position that has been roundly rejected by the

46

563 F3d at 449-56.

See id at 448-49 (noting how in Duncan the Supreme Court "cit[ed] the English Declaration and Bill of Rights, Blackstone's Commentaries, early state constitutions, and other evidence from the Founding era").
48 See Heller, 128 S Ct at 2798 (explaining that Blackstone described the right to bear arms
as "one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen").
49 Nordyke, 563 F3d at 452-54. O'Scannlain also notes that many academics have taken the
view that the introductory clause makes reference to "the security of a free State" to stress state
independence from the federal government, id at 450-51 & n 10, which Justice Scalia (unconvincingly in my view) tries to avoid by rewriting that language to refer to "security of a free polity,"
Heller, 128 S Ct at 2800, thereby deemphasizing the federalism angle.
50
NRA, 567 F3d at 859.
47
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Supreme Court." But surely his belittling of Blackstone proves too
much in light of the extensive, if selective, Supreme Court reliance on
Blackstone's work. What is therefore required is a closer examination
of Easterbrook's particular views on this question to see the extent to
which they are congruent with Heller, which of course cited Blackstone profusely. That single fact suggests that the O'Scannlain approach is more in tune with the Supreme Court on this substantive
issue than that of Easterbrook, who shows no reluctance to deviate
from the current Supreme Court's preferred interpretive practices.
The waters are, as ever, muddied by the further complication that
the relevant date for assessing any argument on incorporation is 1868,
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that point seems
incorrect for two reasons. First, as Judge O'Scannlain observes, there is
strong evidence that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment also
read their Blackstone and took the same favorable attitude to the right
to keep and bear arms as did the framers of the Second Amendment.
That point does not go to the question of whether the right to keep and
bear arms deserves the title of a fundamental right, but whether incorporation was achieved through one or another of the clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. At this point, the weaknesses of Justice Scalia's Heller decision become more apparent. By reading out the initial
clause, Justice Scalia knocked the props out from the structuralist claim
that the Second Amendment was intended to protect the state militias
against federal overriding, without limiting the power of the federal
government to impose the uniform standards needed when the militia
was called into the service of the national government.
On this point, moreover, Cruikshank and Presser show just how
difficult it is for any judge or justice to make the relevant judgments.
As O'Scannlain notes, there is some evidence to the effect that the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were concerned about the
danger that state governments would disarm their citizens." That fear
51

Id.

See Nordyke, 563 F3d at 455-56:
Representative James Wilson, a supporter of the Fourteenth Amendment, described Blackstone's scheme of absolute rights as synonymous with civil rights, in a speech in favor of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 (a precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment).... Similarly, Representative Roswell Hart listed "the right of the people to keep and bear arms," among other
rights, as inherent in a "republican government."
Note too that the reference to a "republican government" echoes the language in the body of the
Constitution: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government." US Const Art IV, § 4.
53 See Nordyke, 563 F3d at 456 ("While the generation of 1789 envisioned the right as a
component of local resistance to centralized tyranny, whether British or federal, the generation
of 1868 envisioned the right as safeguard to protect individuals from oppressive or indifferent
52
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seemed farfetched in Cruikshank, to say the least, where white gangs
appeared to operate with the implicit blessing of state authorities to
terrorize the newly freed black citizens in their exercise of their individual rights. The elaborate discussion in the case to the effect that
nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment interfered with the state's right
and duty to protect the civil rights of its citizens appears naive given
that only the federal government was prepared to protect black citizens from abuses or indifference by local officials."
By contrast, in Presser,the practical dispute was whether Illinois
could punish members of a group known as Lehr und Wehr Verein (a
teaching and defense union) that wanted to organize its own paramilitary group in Illinois , which could have easily been viewed as a threat
to the liberty and property of other individuals within the state. As
noted earlier,6 Presser pushed hard on the structural view of the
Second Amendment, going so far as to hold that the provisions that
allowed the state to disarm the group were constitutional even if they
had to be severed from other portions of the statute.s7
Cruikshank and Presser thus tell very different tales about the
operation of local militias outside the direct control of the state. In
Cruikshank, the passive behavior of the state officials in Reconstruction-era Louisiana meant that local groups had taken steps to strip
members of black groups of their right of keeping and bearing arms.
The refusal to incorporate the Second Amendment (along with all other provisions of the Bill of Rights) thus left these individuals unable to
count on the federal government to forestall abuse. The entire episode
showed why the Fourteenth Amendment included § 5, which allowed
for the congressional enforcement of the basic rights of all citizens of
the United States.! Holding that the Second Amendment did not apply
to the states let the local forces of disruption have their way.
By contrast, in Presser,the diligent enforcement by state officials
appears to have protected state citizens against local abuse, such that
the incorporation of the Second Amendment could easily have
blocked state governments from disarming rascals who wanted to strip
other citizens of their civil rights. The threat of misconduct by fringe
groups is a constant in both cases, and the differential in responses of
local governments."). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction
148 (Yale 1998) (arguing that "a maxim like the preamble to the Second Amendment could warn
the people of any state to be wary of any legislature, even a state legislature, that sought to disarm them").
See Cruikshank, 92 US at 550-55.
5
55
See Presser,116 US at 254.
56
See note 10 and accompanying text.
5
116 US at 263-64.
58 See US Const Amend XV, § 5.
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Louisiana and Illinois suggests that incorporation speaks with two
voices. It offers real benefits, as in Cruikshank, insofar as it allows the
federal government to protect the right of isolated racial minorities to
keep and bear arms. Yet by the same token, it would have hampered
Illinois from dealing with its own dissidents, depending on how broadly any police power protection to the basic rule was read. We see here
in microcosm the structural difficulty with the full system of incorporation. We are never sure whether the constitutional protections so
afforded will help the guys in the white or the black hats.
Positive versus Natural Law

B.

Easterbrook does not deal with any of the historical complexities,
but instead launches into a digression on the structuralist theme. At no
point does he seek to link up the natural law strand of American constitutionalism. Instead he invokes a crude positivism-the law is what
the sovereign says it is-that, on this point at least, works at crosscurrents with both Heller and our broader constitutional traditions.
His initial premise is that "the second amendment protects only the
interest of law-abiding citizens."" The recent case that he cites to support this proposition is United States v Jackson,m which quite sensibly
denies that any individual has a constitutional right to keep guns in
hand when distributing illegal drugs.' That decision of course falls
within the narrowest conception of the police power, which has always
prohibited the use of force to assist in criminal activity-which drug
distribution surely is.
Jackson does not, however, raise the salient question, which is
whether the state may manipulate its definitions of lawful conduct in
whatever way it sees fit. Thus, Easterbrook first asks whether the militia clause would prohibit the ownership of long guns but not handguns, but offers no answer to his own query." He then switches to a
much more controversial hypothetical whereby a state decides "that
people cornered in their homes must surrender rather than fight
back-in other words, that burglars should be deterred by the criminal
law rather than self help."63 He regards this hypothetical as a hard case
because he thinks that the state may alter the law of self-defense in
whatever fashion it sees fit." But, if so, then suppose the state insists
that all individuals have to rely on police enforcement, even if they
59

NRA, 567 F3d at 859.

60

555 F3d 635 (7th Cir 2009).
Id at 636.
See NRA, 567 F3d at 859.
Id.
Id at 859-60.

61
62
63
64
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must let others kill them in the home or on the streets, rather than risk
the possibility of harming some third person, or even the assailant
himself. At this point, Easterbrook runs smack into a long tradition
dating back to Hobbes, if not earlier, which treats the right of selfpreservation as the primary natural right that no state can restrict,
even if it wanted to." After all, the worst punishment for self-defense
would be death, perhaps after torture, so that the rational victim
would always take his chances on resistance if the law were valid.6
The harder question is whether any man could ever be put to that
grim choice under the Constitution. Justice Scalia's view of the matter
in Heller seems to preclude that horrific possibility by observing quite
simply that "the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the
Second Amendment right," and further that the nature of this specific guarantee is not bounded by the low rational basis test." What possible sense does it make to provide a constitutional protection to keep
and bear arms that the state can negate by a statute that eviscerates
the rights of self-defense? One may as well say that the adoption of
the Alien and Sedition Acts trumps the constitutional protections for
freedom of speech and the press, or that private property can be occupied in perpetuity by strangers so long as the state says that no individual is entitled to remove trespassers from his own land. The only
way to conduct this constitutional inquiry is against the natural law
background that prominently permeated the debates of 1868 as it did
those of 1791.
Judge Easterbrook senses, perhaps, that he is on thin ice when he
notes, quite correctly, that the common law rules of self-defense are
not immutable, but can be varied "by requiring people to retreat when
possible, and to use non-lethal force when retreat is not possible.""
But no one questions the efforts to tweak the rules in ways that respect the integrity of the person while seeking to prevent unnecessary
harms to others. Nor does it help in this context to observe with respect to these variations that the optimal use of guns is a hotly disputed empirical question, which is not presented in NRA.o Just about
everyone understands that the common law of self-defense is necessarily subject both to evolution in its details and to variation across
65
See, for example, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 98 (Cambridge 1991) (Richard Tuck, ed)
("A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.").
6
See id.
67
128 S Ct at 2817.
68 Id at 2817 n 27 (noting that if a rational basis test were used for enumerated rights, these
rights would amount to no more than redundant prohibitions on irrational laws).
69 NRA, 567 F3d at 859.
70 See id at 860.
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states. In addition to the retreat theme, other rules of criminal and
civil liability restrict the use of lethal force in defense of property. But
one can look high and low in both the civil and criminal law of selfdefense without finding a single statute or case that abrogates the right
of self-defense in the face of deadly force. It is that core of the selfdefense right that is inconsistent with Easterbrook's explicit positivism.
The concern with total abrogation is not unique to the Second
Amendment. The workers' compensation laws in all states limit the
common law cause of action, but they do not abolish it altogether.
Most modem statutes do not differ much from the New York statute
that was sustained against constitutional challenges in New York Central Railroad Co v White." Every workers' compensation action pre-

serves the tort action in cases of willful misconduct, and they supply a
statutory remedy in those cases where the tort cause of action for negligence is abrogated.72 Indeed, in affirming the constitutionality of the
New York statute, White explicitly stressed this quid pro quo rationale
by noting that workers' compensation substituted a limited but certain
remedy for a risky negligence action promising high damages. Both
of these features are key to upholding the constitutionality of the statute, and this same logic carried over to sustain the constitutionality of
the automobile no-fault statutes more than fifty years later.4 There is
quite simply no precedent that allows the state to just eliminate all
forms of self-protection.
C. Incorporation
Easterbrook's last point addresses, albeit briefly, the ultimate issue in the case, the incorporation of the Second Amendment through
the Fourteenth in the wake of Slaughter-House, which eviscerated
incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Early on
in his opinion, Easterbrook mentions in passing that the plaintiffs
raised the possibility of overruling that decision, which no circuit
could do." But even if that could be done, it would still be necessary to
243 US 188 (1917).
See, for example, id at 192.
73 Id at 201:
If the employee is no longer able to recover as much as before in case of being injured
through the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in all cases of
injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of the damages.
74 See, for example, Pinnick v Cleary, 271 NE2d 592, 611 (Mass 1971) (noting that the
Massachusetts no-fault statute, which limited the right to sue in tort, did not impact any fundamental rights protected by the first ten amendments of the Constitution).
75 See NRA, 567 F3d at 857-58. See also Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203,237-38 (1997).
71
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show that the right to keep and bear arms counts as a fundamental
liberty under the clause. The most authoritative enumeration of those
rights prior to 1868 is the list of privileges and immunities offered by
Bushrod Washington in Corfield v Coryell," which covers a lot of
ground but does not include the right to bear arms. Corfield is, of
course, not conclusive in light of the subsequent evolution of Supreme
Court doctrine with its stress on the preservation of fundamental individual rights against government intrusion.
Easterbrook does not wade into these difficulties, but instead
seeks to slow down the incorporation bandwagon by invoking Justice
Louis Brandeis's famous dissent in New State Ice Co v Liebmann:" "It

is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."78 That passage supports the proposition that decentralized
authorities pose less threat to the liberties of ordinary people than a
single national government. But its application to this current problem
is highly doubtful. Justice Brandeis wrote his aphorism before the
1937 Supreme Court revolution expanded the scope of the Commerce
Clause so that it covered all economic activities, no matter how local
they might appear.79 At this point the laboratory image collides with
the implicit premise of the modern Commerce Clause cases, which
trumpet comprehensive uniformity as the goal, even as their inevitable indirect, cross-border effects undercut any laboratory argument.
At best, the Brandeis insight operates to create a default provision
against the federal intervention in internal state activities in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary in any federal law.More to the point, New State Ice had nothing at all to do with incorporation. Its underlying issue was whether Oklahoma could by
statute require "proof of necessity" before its state corporation commission could issue permits for the "manufacture, sale or distribution
of ice."', In this late pre-New Deal decision, Justice George Sutherland struck a blow against the state creation of monopolies or cartels
by refusing to let states protect incumbent firms against new competi76

6 F Cases 546,551-52 (CC ED Pa 1823).

77 285 US 262 (1932).

78
NRA, 567 F3d at 860 (defending the use of states as laboratories for legal experimentation), citing New State Ice, 285 US at 311 (Brandeis dissenting).
79
See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 36-37 (1937) (invoking an expansive conception of the Commerce Clause).
80 See, for example, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 460-61 (1991) (adopting a "plain
statement" principle to avoid potential constitutional collisions).
81 New State Ice, 285 US at 271-72 (explaining that the statute allowed denial of a permit
where existing facilities were sufficient).
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tors. But the props under his position were effectively dashed with the
Court's decision in Nebbia v New York,2 which upheld an anticompetitive criminal statute that set minimum prices for milk.n I agree with
Justice Sutherland that there is little or no reason to allow the experimentation in state cartels. But even Brandeis's view accepted the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and only argued for a lenient standard of review." New State Ice could never be cited to block
the incorporation of the Second Amendment. Nor could it be used to
promote the rational basis standard now used to decide challenges to
economic regulation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, given that Heller has embraced some, as yet undefined,
higher standard of review. I very much doubt that mentioning four
provisions of the Bill of Rights that are not incorporated will slow
down any Supreme Court justice who thinks that Heller was rightly
decided. Easterbrook did not elaborate on his brief suggestion given
his belief that these matters "are for the Justices rather than a court of
appeals."" But it is highly unlikely that his straws into the wind will
survive Judge O'Scannlain's gale force arguments for incorporation.
CONCLUSION

Let me state a few words to place NRA in a larger constitutional
framework. Both Easterbrook and O'Scannlain count, in some broad
sense, as conservative judges. But that similarity conceals the gulf that
arises when the former is standoffish to the originalist tradition that
the latter embraces. This contrast reveals just how unsympathetic
Judge Easterbrook is to the new dominant method of the Supreme
Court. Left to his own devices, he would either ignore this evidence or
dwell on its limitations. In this regard, stare decisis notwithstanding, I
see no way that his cavalier dismissal of Blackstone and similar luminaries can be squared with the near reverence that these sources hold
for justices on every side of many constitutional questions.
In NRA, Easterbrook's reticence derives from his deep belief in
judicial hierarchy. But unlike his powerhouse commercial and regulatory decisions, this style will not make him an appellate court opinion
leader in constitutional law. By virtue of his conception of his role,
NRA pales in comparison to his magnificent opinion in American
Booksellers Association, Inc v Hudnut,6 which invalidated the City of
291 US 502 (1934).
Id at 538-39 (asserting that price control "is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt").
8
New State Ice,285 US at 311.
8
NRA, 567 F3d at 860.
86 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985).
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Indianapolis's overbroad antipornography ordinance." In the end, it
does not seem wise to try to split the baby by cutting off substantive
discussions by hiding behind the apparent restrictions in the role of
lower court judges. The better approach by far is to take your best
shot on the issue, and leave it for the Supreme Court to decide whether you have misspoken.
Ironically, Judge Easterbrook should have followed the Posner
strategy in Khan by first announcing that he would deny incorporation, and then offering his complete analysis of the case on the merits.
Half measures do not work. The Supreme Court would have been
ideally positioned to decide this case if Judge Easterbrook had decided to join issue by taking on Judge O'Scannlain's decision in Nordyke. The lesson of NRA is to beware of a half-hearted commitment
to judicial restraint.

8
Id at 332. See Geoffrey R. Stone, American Bookselers Association v Hudnut: "The Government Must Leave to the Peoplethe Evaluation of Ideas," 77 U Chi L Rev 1219,1219 (2010).

